Cakewalk on air By Air Marshal (retd) Vinod Patney

Cakewalk on air

By Air Marshal (retd) Vinod Patney


In early May 1999, there were reports of Pakistani infiltration into our side of the Line of Control (LoC) but there was little definite intelligence information. Reports on the number of infiltrators varied from a few ten to a few hundred. Even their locations were, at best, inaccurate approximations. Possibly, this was the main reason for some initial difficulty experienced in arriving at sound military responses. The situation was compounded by the earlier periodic intelligence reports that showed that Pakistani military capability was inadequate for a serious offensive to be launched against us.

The correctness of this estimate was borne out by subsequent events. Our military capability was indeed far superior. Western Air Command (WAC) was alerted on May 11 or 12, 1999. Within a day or two, reconnaissance missions were launched on a regular basis but no actionable intelligence was garnered. However, area familiarisation missions were flown, high-altitude air-to-ground attacks against pin-point targets practised, and operational readiness achieved in short order. We then waited for government clearance to launch air strikes.

The clearance was received on the evening of May 25, and the first operational missions took to the air in the early morning of May 26. The government clearance included a debilitating instruction prohibiting the Air Force to operate beyond the LoC. A few important aspects that were a fallout of this very stringent restriction merit mention.
First, in one fell swoop, we handed over the initiative to the enemy. It was now up to them to decide when and how to fashion the air war. The air war should be prosecuted in a proactive and bold manner but, perforce, we now had to adopt a reactive posture. Secondly, the LoC is a zig-zag line nowhere near clearly demarcated on the ground. Hence, particularly against targets close to the LoC, in our attempts not to cross the LoC, the planning and execution of the attacks was far from what could and should have been.

Thirdly, the infiltrators were in well-defended positions that were well-camouflaged and represented very small targets. The air force was hard-pressed to hit these targets effectively. Far greater dividends would have accrued if we were permitted to attack the feeder lines, logistics dumps and other well-defined targets. Fourthly and possibly most importantly, the enemy was well entrenched and at height, and our troops were out in the open with, literally, an uphill task to win back positions occupied by the enemy. They were extremely vulnerable to enemy air attacks and it was a major responsibility of WAC to ensure that enemy air was inhibited from taking action even when the Pakistanis began to suffer major reverses. This was achieved by giving clear signals that we were ready and willing for battle and waiting for the enemy to start. The unequivocal signalling was done by the manner in which our missions were launched throughout the Command, and the obvious preparedness of WAC.

We certainly succeeded as, in a very few days, it was obvious that the enemy would much rather avoid battle or escalation of the conflict. Indeed, civil air lines were soon permitted to commence operations from Srinagar.
Many innovative means were introduced for the safety of our aircraft in the air and to make our attacks against targets on the ground safer and more effective. The use of GPS, even the hastily procured handheld GPS, was a trailblazer. The use of fighter aircraft for attacks in night in mountainous terrain received accolades from professionals in the US and elsewhere. Another innovation was the use of handheld video cameras that were taken on board fighter aircraft to film the areas of possible enemy positions for better and speedier analysis.

All these measures helped. Our Mirage aircraft were locally modified for bombing from higher altitudes and the laser pods that were on trial were pressed into service. The bombing by Mirage aircraft of the Muntho Dhalo admin and logistics camp dealt a body blow from which the enemy just could not recover. The laser pod was used against the position at Tiger Hill and the success can be gauged from the report that when our troops reached the summit, there were only seven Pakistanis left to guard the area.
In spite of difficulties, the Air Force did what was required under the circumstances, and without the benefit of fanfare. There was complete unanimity between the Army and the Air Force in the manner in which the war should be fought, and, as it should be, every single position that was recaptured by our Army was first visited by our Air Force. The pilots, technicians and staff of WAC and those from other commands who fought alongside deserve praise for their professionalism and for a job well done.

I, however, have three regrets. First, one cannot but be saddened by the loss of two fighter aircraft, one helicopter and their pilots and crew. 'It happens in war' is an oft-quoted phrase but it cannot reduce the regret and sorrow of untimely deaths. Secondly, air power should have been used without its hands being tied. Possibly, the war would have been shorter and we would have suffered fewer casualties. Finally, it will remain a regret that we were not pitted against a more worthwhile adversary who was willing to offer combat.
Air Marshal Patney was Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, during the Kargil war.



Flying high

Operation Safedsagar, the air operations in Kargil, was a tough mission for the Air Force because of the difficult terrain and climate. The high altitude limited the bomb loads and the number of airstrips that can be used.
The Air Force's fist involvement in the conflict was on May 11, 1999, with helicopters.

On May 25, the cabinet committee on security authorised attacks without crossing the LoC.

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