MANEKSHAW AND THE ACCESSION OF KASHMIR By Maj Gen VK Singh

From: vinay singh vinay16318@yahoo.co.uk

Subject: MANEKSHAW AND THE ACCESSION OF KASHMIR

To: kamboj_cs@yahoo.co.in

Date: Thursday, 16 July, 2009, 8:40 PM
Dear Brigadier,

I read the account sent my Sunil Arya. There is still some doubt about when (25 or 26 October ?) and where (Srinagar or Jammu?) the Instrument of Accession was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh.

I am giving below an extract from the draft Chapter 2 of the Corps History, dealing with the 1947-48 operations. I would welcome clarifications or comments.

The anecdote concerning Manekshaw and Indira Gandhi during 1971 has been related many times. I am giving an extract from Manekshaw's biography that forms part of my book LEADERSHIP IN THE INDIAN A RMY - BIOGRAPHIES OF TWELVE SODLIERS. The draft was vetted by the Field Marshal in 1996.

Regards

VK Singh
(Maj Gen, Veteran)


EXTRACT FROM CHAPTER 2 OF THE HISTORY OF THE CORPS OF SIGNALS, VOL III
At nightfall on 26 October 1947, the raiders entered Baramula, a prosperous town with a large population of Hindus and Sikhs. For the next few days, the tribesmen indulged in an orgy of murder rape and loot that has few parallels. Homes and shops were systematically plundered before being set aflame. The men were killed and the women raped, with the younger ones being carried off as war booty. The Convent and Mission hospital were not spared, with the Mother Superior and several nuns being killed, along with some patients. Lieutenant Colonel Tom Dykes, then acting Commandant of the Sikh Regimental Centre, who was on leave to be with his wife during her confinement, was also killed. Carrying sacks full of loot and young girls that they had abducted, most of the raiders started back for Pakistan. Their leaders tried to impress on them the need to advance to Srinagar without wasting time, but the Pathans were in no mood to listen. For them, the security of the plundered wealth and the abducted girls were more important than the ‘holy war’ that they were fighting to free their oppressed brethren from the rule of the infidel Dogra Maharaja. Most went back to their villages, promising to return after depositing the looted treasure. Many of the abducted girls were sold in Rawalpindi and Peshawar, others taken to tribal villages, while some were left in a concentration camp at Alibeg in Kashmir state territory being run by the ‘Azad Kashmir Government’. Alibeg was reported to have held over a thousand Kashmir women of all religions of which only a couple of hundred survived.

Operation ‘Rescue’


Faced with the grave threat to his State, the Maharaja of Kashmir approached the Government of India for assistance on 25 October 1947. The Maharaja’s request was considered by the Defence Committee chaired by Lord Mountbatten. It was decided that military assistance would be extended only after the Maharaja had signed the instrument of Accession. On 26 October V.P. Menon flew to Srinagar to obtain the signature of the Maharaja. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel (later Field Marshal) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, then a staff officer in the Military Operations Directorate at Army HQ, who had been sent to assess the military situation. They returned the same night, after obtaining the signature of Maharaja Hari Singh on the Instrument of Accession. According to some accounts, the Maharaja had left for Jammu on 25 October with his family, and the Instrument of accession was signed at Jammu. This is at variance with the account given by Sam Manekshaw. In the Preface to Major General K.S. Bajwa’s book, Jammu and Kashmir War (1947-48) – Political and Military Perspective, he writes: “It was on the night of 26 October that the Maharaja acceded to India, and V.P. Menon and I flew back to Delhi that very night, with Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Gulam Mohd, DP Dhar and other lighting up the air strip with pine torches.

The Army had been warned to be ready to go to Kashmir as soon as the request for military assistance had been received from Maharaja Hari Singh. However, no troops had been earmarked for this assignment. It was only after the formal accession of the State on 26 October that orders were issued to the troops. Major (later Lieutenant General) S.K. Sinha was then a staff officer in HQ Delhi & East Punjab Command. He mentions that he was attending a party in the Delhi Gymkhana Club at about 10 pm on 26 October when he was summoned to an urgent conference at his headquarters. The Army Commander, Lieutenant General Dudley Russel, informed them that Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to India and sought military assistance to stop the raiders who had invaded the State. It had been decided that a battalion would fly to Srinagar early next morning and a brigade group move by road to Jammu. Being deployed on internal security duties in Gurgaon, close to Delhi, 1 Sikh was selected for Srinagar and 50 Parachute Brigade earmarked fro Jammu. An emergency signal was sent to the 1 Sikh before the meeting broke off ordering the unit less two companies to concentrate at Palam airfield by 4 am next morning and be prepared to fly on an operational mission. The rest of the battalion would join them next day. The battalion was told that operation instructions would be handed over at the airfield, along with ammunition, rations and warm clothing.

The instructions given to Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjt Rai, CO 1 Sikh, at the airfield next morning were brief and succinct, primarily due to lack of precise intelligence about the situation in Kashmir. His first task was to secure Srinagar airport and civil aviation wireless station. Having done this, he was to drive the tribesmen away from Srinagar and aid the local government in maintaining law and order in the city. He was asked to land at Srinagar airfield only if he received clearance from the airport on wireless or by hand signals; in the absence of both, he was to circle the airfield and scan the countryside to confirm the presence of raiders. In case he found that they had occupied the airfield, he was to fly back and land at Jammu.

The first flight comprising of nine Dakotas, six from private airlines and three from then RIAF, took off at 5 am, carrying the tactical headquarters of 1 Sikh, one company of 1 Sikh and one composite battery of 13 Field Regiment. They landed at Srinagar at about 8.30 am. Fortunately, the raiders still not reached Srinagar. However, the situation was extremely critical. All that lay between the raiders and Srinagar were two platoons of State troops who were dug in about 5 km east of Baramula. Colonel Ranjit Rai appreciated that the State troops would not be able to stop the raiders, unless reinforced.. He decided to send forward his sole company for this task, informing Delhi of his plan. Later in the afternoon, Rai sent another message confirming the fall of Baramula. He stressed that the raiders were likely to reach Srinagar soon and unless 1 Sikh was built up to full strength by the afternoon of 28 October, he was not confident of being able to save Srinagar. Shortly afterwards, Brigadier Hira Lal Atal, who had accompanied 1 Sikh as Liaison Officer with the State Government, reported that the civil administration had ceased to exist, refugees were thronging the airport and at least one brigade was required for the defence of the Valley. In reply to his messages, Ranjit Rai was informed that the Air Force would be carrying out air strafing next day. Also, a brigade headquarters and an infantry battalion would be flown to Srinagar on 29-30 October, followed by another battalion very soon.

By the end of the day on 27 October, 1 Sikh had been built up almost to a battalion in strength. Early next morning, Ranjit Rai went forward with the rest of his battalion, with the intention of intercepting the raiders and preventing their advance into the Valley. Debussing his unit about two km short of Baramula, he deployed his troops in a defensive position on the hills. Then, he proceeded towards the town with a small escort. When they were about half way down the road, the party came under fire from a medium machine gun located on a hill to the south of the town and had to beat a hasty retreat. Ranjit Rai’s jeep got stuck and he started walking back, accompanied by some of his men who were wounded. Just then he was struck by in the face by a burst of automatic fire and was killed, along with the platoon commander who was by his side.


EXTRACT FROM BIOGRAPHY OF
FIELD MARSHAL S.H.F.J. MANEKSHAW, MC
(Leadership in the Indian Army - Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, Sage, New Delhi, 2005)

The most well known anecdote about Sam is the one he often relates himself. In 1971, when refugees from East Pakistan began to cross over into India, Sam was the Army Chief, Indira Gandhi the Prime Minister and Babu Jagjiwan Ram the Minister for Defence or Raksha Mantri. There was a meeting of the Cabinet on 27 April 1971, to which Sam was invited as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Prime Minister appeared to be distraught and angry. Refugees from East Pakistan were pouring into West Bengal, Assam and other parts of Eastern India. Waving a telegram from the Chief Minister of one of the Eastern States, she asked Sam, "Can't you do something?"
"What do you want me to do?" asked Sam.
"Go into East Pakistan."
"This would mean war," said Sam.
"I know", said Indira Gandhi. "We don't mind a war."
"Have you read the Bible" asked Sam.
"What has the Bible to do with this?" asked Swaran Singh, the Minister for External Affairs.

"In the Bible, it is written that God said let there be light, and there was light. You think that by saying let there be war, there can be a war? Are you ready for a war? I am not."

The Prime Minister did not seem to be very pleased and there was a scowl on her face. Sam went on to explain the reasons for his reluctance to go to war with Pakistan immediately. In a few weeks, the monsoon would set in, making the ground unsuitable for operations as East Pakistan had a number of rivers, which were prone to flooding. All movement would have to be on roads, which could be blocked. The Air Force would not be able to support the ground troops due to bad weather. The armoured division was in Jhansi and one of the infantry divisions in Secunderabad. Moving them to the East would require time as well as all available road and rail space. The wheat crop was being harvested and movement of foodgrains would be adversely affected. Turning towards the Agriculture Minister, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, Sam said, "If there is a famine, people will blame you, not me."

The Agriculture Minister squirmed in his seat. Sam then turned to the Finance Minister, Y.B. Chavan, and said, " My armoured division has only twelve tanks which are operational. You know why? Because whenever we asked you for funds, you said you had no money."

Sam advised postponement of the operations till the winter months. This would give him enough time to build up the infrastructure required for large scale operations in the East. The Government would also get enough time to garner international support through diplomatic channels, so that other countries did not interfere or extend military assistance to Pakistan. During winter the Northern passes would be blocked with snow, eliminating the threat of intervention by the Chinese. Most members of the Cabinet seemed to see the logic of his arguments and nodded their heads, though Indira Gandhi seemed to be somewhat unhappy.

Finally, Sam addressed the Prime Minister herself. "As your Army Chief, it is my duty to put the facts before you. If your father had me as the Army Chief in 1962 instead of General Thapar, and he had told me to throw the Chinese out, I would have said the same thing and he would not have been shamed the way he was. If you still want me to go ahead, I will. But I guarantee you a one hundred percent defeat. Now tell me what you want me to do."

There was a stunned silence. Then the Defence Minister, Babu Jagjiwan Ram, said,"Shyam, - he always pronounced Sam as Shyam, a popular Indian name - maan jao na" (please agree).

Sam said, "I have given my professional assessment. It is now for the Government to take a decision."

The Prime Minister did not say anything. She appeared to be visibly angry. She closed the meeting, asking everyone to come back at four o'clock. As everybody rose and started leaving, the Prime Minister asked Sam to stay back. When they were alone, he offered to resign, either on physical or mental grounds.

"Sit down, Sam," she said. "I don't want your resignation. Just tell me, is every thing you said earlier true?"
"Yes, it is. Look, it is my job to fight, and fight to win. Today, if you go to war, you will lose. Give me another six months and I guarantee you a hundred percent success. But I want to make one thing quite clear. There must be one commander. I don't mind working under the BSF, the CRPF, or anybody you like. But I will not have a soviet telling me what to do. I must have one political master giving me directions. I don't want the refugee ministry, home ministry, defence ministry, all telling me what to do. Now, you make up your mind."

"All right, Sam, nobody will interfere," said the Prime Minister."You will be in command."

"Thank you," said Sam. "I guarantee you a victory." And so it was. Later, Sam was to recall that there is a very thin line between becoming a Field Marshal and being dismissed.

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THE END